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19681

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

The dissent, speaking through Judge Jasen, warned of the
danger of forum-shopping, which the majority had found unlikely
because of the eased transfer provisions of the amended judiciary
article.43 Another point emphasized by the minority was that the
majority's interpretation usurped the Legislature's function to
decide whether or not to deprive specialized courts of their exclusive jurisdiction.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(a): Consent of parties not needed to
effect transfer to lower court.
The possibility of transfer of an action to a court with lower
monetary jurisdiction is a valuable factor in discouraging plaintiffs
from overstating their claims for damages, CPLR 325(c) provides
for removal on consent to a court of limited jurisdiction.
Where it appears that the amount of damages sustained are less than
demanded, and a lower court would have had jurisdiction of the action
but for the amount of damages demanded, the court in which an action
is pending may remove it to the lower court upon reduction of the
amount of damages demanded to a sum within the jurisdictional limits
of the lower court and upon consent of all parties to the action other
than a defendant who has interposed no counterclaim and over whom
the lower court would have had jurisdiction if the action had originally
been commenced there....
However, section 19(a) of the amended judiciary article of the
New York Constitution makes no mention of either the requirement of showing excessive damages claimed, or the method of
transfer by consent of parties. The only requirement of the constitutional transfer provision is that the lower court have "jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties." 44 A recent
case, Hesse v. Hrubsa,45 discussed the question raised by the second
change, i.e., whether consent of the parties remains a valid method
of obtaining transfer.
Two transfers were involved-one from the supreme court to
the county court, and one from the county court to the district
court. The defendant, a non-resident of Suffolk County, had been
served outside of that county, preventing either the county or district court from taking jurisdiction.46 However, when the transfers
were actually made, the defendant appeared without protest and
for such a distinction since it is based on the premise that the Legislature
cannot withdraw any form of action, even if statutorily created, from the
jurisdiction of the supreme court.
43N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19.
44N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a).
4555 Misc. 2d 610, 286 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1968).
46 N.Y. JuDICrARv LAw § 190(3).
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defended on the merits in the district court. He attacked the
transfers only after losing the case there.
The court found that the constitutional provision superseded
the CPLR requirement, and did eliminate the method of transfer
by consent. In spite of the fact that the original service would not
have conferred jurisdiction on the lower courts, it was held that
since the defendant appeared and defended without objection, he
became one of the 4classes
of persons over whom the court had
7
personal jurisdiction.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(a): Consent of surrogate not needed
to effect transfer.
Under the CPLR,4 the supreme court may transfer an action
pending before it to the surrogate's court if the case involves a
decedent's estate within the latter court's jurisdiction. A prerequisite for this transfer has been the consent of the surrogate to
receive the action. Although this consent was usually obtainable,
when the facilitation of litigation. 49 or the prevention of calendar
delays in the supreme court 50 warranted transfer, it remained
discretionary with the surrogate.5
Recently, the appellate division, first department, in Garland v.
Raunhein,52 indicated that the general transfer provision of the
amended judiciary article of the Constitution 5 3 has, by failure to
mention consent as a requirement, eliminated it. After stating that
the CPLR transfer section had been superseded by the constitutional
provision, the court ordered the transfer of a partition action
brought in the supreme court to the surrogate's court without any
mention of requesting or obtaining the surrogate's consent.
Although this decision seems warranted by the language of
the amendment, in a few instances the consent of the surrogate
has been sought on a voluntary basis. 5 4 Moreover, consent of the
surrogate is still needed for the transfer of cases from the supreme
court in one department to a surrogate's court in another, since
4' Martin v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 126, 261 N.Y.S.2d 820 (County Ct.

Essex County 1965).
449 CPLR 325(d). Parallel provisions appear in SCPA § 209 and § 501.
Shearn v. Lord, 16 Misc. 2d 224, 156 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 823, 161 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1957).
5OSee In re Mayer, 158 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County
July5 1 18, 1967).
n re Laedke, 28 Misc. 2d 651, 210 N.Y.S2d 180 (Surr. Ct. Nassau
County 1961).
5229 App. Div. 2d 383, 288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1968).
53 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). This result was predicted by the commentator in 58A McICNEY's SCPA § 209, commentary 210-11 (1967).
54In re Suchoff, 55 Misc. 2d 284, 285 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Surr. Ct. Nassau
County 1967); In re Breen, 45 Misc. 2d 374, 256 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Surr. Ct.
Richmond County 1965).

